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returns of the mutual funds managed by publicly-traded management companies do not appear to
outperform those of the mutual funds managed by private management companies. This finding is
consistent with both the  risk reduction and agency cost arguments that have been made in the
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 1. Introduction
The mutual fund industry has been one of the fastest growing sectors within the Canadian
capital market over the past ten years. As shown in Table 1, the growth of the Canadian mutual fund
industry has been remarkable. According to the Investment Funds Institute of Canada, as of June
2000, Canadians invested more than $400 billion in mutual funds -- more than ten times the total at
the beginning of 1991. A survey in 1999 found that close to 40% of Canadians now own a mutual
fund, an increase of 168% since 1991.
1  The mutual fund industry has benefitted from a combination
of low interest rates, the increasing age of the population, a growing large deficit in the Canada
Pension Plan, the moving of savings from defined-benefit pension plans to defined-contribution plans,
and an increasing awareness of mutual fund products over the past decade.
2  
The purpose of these popular investment vehicles to provide professional management and
the opportunity for investors to diversify.  Each mutual fund within the larger fund complex is
overseen by a board of directors which is responsible for carrying out the activities of the fund. The
board of directors, in turn, appoints a management company that chooses a portfolio manager which
in turn determines the composition of the investment portfolio within the bounds set by the fund’s
objective.  Like other business organizations, there are two major forms of ownership structure of
these management companies: partnership and corporation.
An interesting puzzle that exists in the industry is that some management companies choose
to be publicly-traded on an exchange while others choose not to be. As of June 2000, there were3 They are AGF Management Ltd., C.I. Fund Management Inc., Dundee Bancorp Inc., Investors Group
Corp., Mackenzie Financial Corp., Sceptre Investment Counsel Ltd., and  Trimark Financial Corp. In August
1998, C.I. Fund Management Inc. acquired all the shares of the BPI financial Corp. BPI financial Corp was also a
publicly-traded management company from August 1994 to August 1998.
4 Financial Post Canadian Mutual Fund Data Base.
5 Most Canadian mutual funds studies have focused on the performance of individual funds. For example,
Grant (1976) found the Canadian mutual funds are conservatively managed and not well diversified. Dhingra
(1978) found the ex-post systematic risk levels of mutual funds are consistent with their stated investment
objectives. Calvert and Lefoll (1981) concluded that Canadian funds perform no better than the market after risk
adjustment. Berkowitz and Kotowitz (1993) looked at the incentives and efficiency in the market for management
services and found that the asset-based scheme compensation provides a strong incentive for managers to
maximize risk-adjusted fund returns.
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approximately 200 companies managing mutual funds in the Canadian market and of those, seven
were publicly-traded.
3  Although the number of publicly-traded management companies is relatively
small compared to the number of private management companies, they have been playing an
important role in the Canadian mutual fund industry.  More than 400 mutual funds were under
management of these seven publicly-traded management companies as of June 2000.  At the same
time, the aggregate net asset value managed by these publicly traded management companies was
approximately $155 billion which accounted for 40 percent of the total assets held by the Canadian
mutual fund industry.
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Given the growing popularity of mutual funds and their sheer size within the Canadian capital
market, it is important to try to get some insight into how the ownership structure of the management
companies affects the performance of the mutual funds they manage.
5  Publicly-traded management
companies are characterized by the separation of the ownership and management roles similar to
other corporate entities. The question of how diffusion of ownership affects the performance of
companies has attracted a great deal of attention in the financial economics literature. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) suggested that the managers' incentive to maximize shareholder value increases with3
their level of ownership. The greater the concentration of ownership, the better is the performance
of the firm.  Demsetz (1983), however, argued that the shareholder, who decides to dilute the
ownership structure, must already be aware of the consequences of the moral hazard problem of the
managers. The cost of loosening control over the managers should be offset by other advantages of
diluted ownership, such as the lower capital acquisition cost. Therefore, we should not expect to see
any relationship between the performance of the firm and the concentration of ownership. In a later
paper, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) provided empirical evidence supporting the absence of any
systematic relationship between ownership concentration and performance (measured by accounting
profit). A few years later, Morck et al (1988) found a significant relationship between firm
performance (measured by Tobins Q) and ownership concentration. The authors showed that the
performance of the firm increased and then decreased with concentration of ownership. McConnel
and Servaes (1990) also found the inverted U-shape relation between performance and ownership of
the firm, which is consistent with Morck et al's finding.
Cole and Mehran (1998) examined the performance of a sample of 94 thrift institutions before
and after the expiration of an ownership-structure restriction. The authors found that firms performed
much better after the restriction expired and better performance was associated with greater
ownership concentration.  In a recent paper, Himmelberg et al (1999) showed that ownership and
performance of the firm are both endogenously determined by some partly observed exogenous
variables. After controlling for these exogenous variables (firm characteristics and firm fixed effects),
they were unable to conclude that ownership affects the performance of the firm.
 The primary goal of this paper is to examine if the ownership of mutual fund management
companies affects their performance.  This is an important question since if indeed ownership and6  See Berkowitz & Kotowitz (1993, 2000), Gruber (1996), Sirri & Tufano (1998), Chevalier & Ellison
(1997), and Del Guercio & Tkac (2000), among others. 
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performance are related, investors should take this information into account when they decide in
which mutual funds to  invest. The link between the performance of mutual funds and the ownership
of the management company is through the relationship between historical fund performance and the
demand for funds by investors.  This relationship has been examined by many authors in the literature
and found to be quite strong, irrespective of the performance measure used.
6  As the performance of
the mutual fund increases, investors increase their holdings of the fund causing the net asset value
(NAV) of the fund to increase.  Since the management company receives a fixed percentage of the
NAV, improved performance enhances the flow of fees into the management company which, after
expenses, accrues to the owners of the management company.   To the best of our knowledge,
the relationship between ownership and performance has not been examined for mutual fund
management companies. The delegation of decision-making responsibility and the associated agency
costs within the mutual fund complex are similar to those within the corporate structure typically
studied in the literature. The major advantage of choosing mutual fund management companies when
examining the ownership/performance relationship is that it allows us to control for the intra-industry
heterogeneity across firms since the technology of the mutual fund management companies is quite
homogenous across firms and only requires human capital. The restrictive regulations governing the
mutual fund industry also dramatically reduces the companies' idiosyncratic characteristics.
Once the relationship between ownership and performance is established, we then examine
how the ownership of mutual fund management companies affects their performance. Diffusion of
ownership can affect performance in a number of ways. First, as Jensen and Meckling (1976) pointed5
out, managers of more diffusely held companies are expected to increase their excess perquisite
consumption and thus increase the cost of production.  A second effect of diffuse public ownership
involves the risk-taking incentives of managers. Due to the difficulty of observing the expenditures
of managers and the risk of the assets, previous researchers have not been able to differentiate
between these two effects. The mutual fund management company provides us a rare opportunity to
clarify this issue. For these firms, the link between ownership and manager expenditures can be
directly observed through the administrative fees of the mutual funds. If publicly-traded management
companies have greater excess perquisite consumption than private management companies, then the
difference between the expense ratio and management fee, which includes the administrative fees, will
reflect this phenomenon.
Further, unlike most other firms, the risk of the assets held by management companies can be
easily measured. Because the assets of the management company consist of the mutual funds they
manage, the risk associated with an investment in mutual funds can be calculated from the risk
associated with their net asset value returns. There are two competitive arguments in the literature
on how the concentration of ownership affects the manager’s risk taking behavior. The first argument,
by Galai and Masulis (1976), is based on option price theory. The idea is that the greater is the
concentration of ownership within firms, the greater is the incentive for the managers to maximize
the shareholders’ value. Since equity can be viewed as a call option on the value of the firm with the
amount of debt as the strike price, given the debt-to-equity ratio, one way for the manager to increase
the shareholder’s value is to increase the volatility of the underlying assets. Essentially, increasing the
risk of the assets transfers wealth from the creditors to the shareholders. However, this argument is
not relevant for mutual fund management companies since the fund companies typically have much7   In an earlier paper, May (1995) also found evidence supporting the risk reduction argument.
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less debt than other types of companies. Hence, the transfer of wealth  effect through increasing the
risk of the asset holdings may not provide the same benefit to the management companies’
shareholders as would be expected with more debt-oriented firms.
The second argument which is presented by Smith and Stulz (1985) is that the greater the
managerial ownership, the more risk averse are the managers and hence they tend to adopt more
hedging and other risk-reduction strategies. The reason is that the manager’s portfolio might not be
well diversified and, therefore, as her ownership share increases, she has an incentive to reduce the
riskiness of the firms’s assets. In a recent paper, Zhang (1998) also showed that in the presence of
a controlling shareholder within a firm, the under-diversified controlling shareholder is more averse
to risky projects than would be the atomistic shareholders whose portfolios are more diversified.
Using a sample of 302 depository institutions, Chen et al (1998) found that as the concentration of
ownership increases, the level of risk taking decreases.
7  Since neither the  risk reduction nor wealth
transfer argument  precludes the existence of the other effect, the relationship between ownership
structure and risk taking behavior will depend on which effect dominates the other. As we note
above, the wealth transfer effect might be quite weak in mutual fund industry due to its low debt
feature, hence, it would be expected that the risk reduction effect is the dominant force for fund
management companies. Consequently, the funds managed by publicly-traded managed management
companies might have  greater risk than do the funds managed by private management companies
             At the same time, however, investing in risky assets increases the risk of the managers'
portfolio since her income is based on the performance of the mutual funds she manages. In addition,
investing in riskier assets usually requires greater effort on the part of managers. Therefore, publicly-7
traded management companies must provide higher compensation for the managers due to both the
greater risk and greater effort they undertake. Consequently, the publicly-traded management
companies may charge a higher management fee than the private management companies.  However,
if publicly-traded management companies are not able to provide sufficiently higher returns to
compensate investors for the higher management fees, this might suggest that fund unit-holders
should avoid mutual fund managed by the publicly-traded management companies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the governance structure within the
mutual fund complex and compares it to that in the usual corporate entity.  Section 3 discusses the
data. Section 4 examines the performance of the mutual funds managed by the publicly-traded
management companies and compares them with the mutual funds managed by the private
management companies. Section 5 examines the factors which account for the difference in their
performance while Section 6 is by way of summary and conclusions.
2.  Ownership Structure and Performance
The governance structure within the mutual fund complex of a publicly-owned management
company is quite similar to the structure within the typical corporate entity studied in the literature.
Figure 1a describes the mutual fund complex when the management company is publicly-owned.  For
simplicity, we assume a single mutual fund under management.   Within this governance structure,
the management company is responsible to its shareholders and delegates decision-making
responsibility for the composition of the investment portfolio to either an internal or external portfolio
manager.  Operating expenses of C are incurred by the management company for administrative,
legal, auditing, etc. activities.  The portfolio manager, on the other hand, receives a wage contract,8
W, that is typically performance-based and unobservable.  The portfolio manager’s security selection
decisions are reflected in the net asset value of the mutual fund (NAV), with the management
company receiving a fixed percentage of the NAV, referred to as the management expense ratio (m),
to recover both fees paid to the portfolio manager and all operating expenses, with the remainder
accruing to the unitholders of the fund.  As residual owners, the shareholders of the management
company receive total fees of m × NAV less the incurred aggregate management expenses of W +
C. 
Within this structure, there are two agency relationships associated with the delegation of
decision-making responsibility.  First is the delegation of the choice of portfolio manager by
shareholders to the management company.   The other is the delegation of security selection, within
the basic objectives of the fund, from the management company to the portfolio manager.   For  the
typical corporation studied in the literature, the governance structure is similar to that of the mutual
fund complex.   Figure 2b shows that shareholders delegate employment decisions to management
who in turn delegate responsibility to employees who make decisions which affect the revenue flows
(R) into the company.   Employees receive wages of W1 which may or may not be performance-based
and management receives a wage of W2   which is typically tied to performance. The residual of R -
W1 - W2 accrues to the shareholders of the firm.   As in the case of the mutual fund complex, there
are again  multiple layers of agency relationships.  In the literature that examines the ownership-
performance question, the agency relationship between management and employees of the firm is
assumed to be completely resolved by the contract between these parties.  Performance is assumed
only to be affected by a single agent - management.  At the same time, the vast mutual fund literature
examining the performance of mutual funds and the relationship between performance and fees,8 The eight publicly-traded management companies are: AGF Management Ltd., BPI Financial Corp.,CI.
Fund Management Inc., Dundee Bancorp Inc., Investors Group Corp., Mackenzie Financial Corp., Sceptre
Investment Inc., and Trimark Financial Corp.
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focuses exclusively on the fee received by the management company even though performance is
influenced by the portfolio manager.  Implicitly, it is assumed that the unobserved contract existing
between the management company and the portfolio manager is sufficiently complete so as to obviate
any agency costs between these two parties.  In keeping with these two literatures upon which this
paper is based, we also assume that a complete contract exists between the management company
and the portfolio manager.  
         
3.  Data Description
In order to learn how ownership affects the performance of management companies, we
examine the performance of the mutual funds managed by Canadian publicly-traded management
companies and compare them with the mutual funds managed by Canadian private management
companies. Using Canadian data has the advantage that the business of the publicly-traded
management companies is reasonably pure. The majority of their business is mutual fund
management and the effect of ownership structure on the performance of the management companies
will be fully reflected in the performance of the mutual funds they manage. In contrast, U.S. mutual
fund management companies are typically involved in other activities, like insurance, underwriting
and brokerage businesses so that the relationship between ownership and fund performance is tainted.
During the sample period, from June 1985 to June 1998, there were eight publicly-traded
management companies in Canada.
8   However, the data for the two smallest publicly-traded
management companies, Dundee Bancorp Inc. and Sceptre Investment Counsel Ltd, are incomplete.9 The private management companies are: Royal Mutual Funds Inc., Fidelity Investments Canada
Limited, TD Asset Management, CIBC Securities Inc., Templeton Management Limited, and AIC Limited.
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Therefore, we restrict our analysis to the six largest publicly-traded management companies. In order
to compare the performance of the mutual funds managed by these six largest publicly-traded
management companies, we choose a matching sample of the six largest private management
companies according to the total assets they managed at the beginning of the sample period (June,
1985).
9  The methodology used to choose these management companies is as follows. First, size of
the management companies is an important factor affecting performance since large companies have
the technology and capital to take advantage of opportunities that arrive. Therefore, we choose
publicly-traded management companies and private management companies whose average total
assets under management are above $100 million. Second, because companies with superior
performance tend to grow larger, we choose the management companies according to their size at
the beginning of the sample period. The relative sizes of the management companies selected in the
mutual fund industries were very stable and always among the top 15 largest management companies
during the sample period in term of total assets under management.
The basic sample includes 446 mutual funds existing in June 1998 managed by the above 12
management companies. The total assets of these funds account for more than 60 percent of the
market share of the Canadian mutual fund industry at that time. The basic data set, derived from the
Financial Post Mutual Fund Database, covers the monthly net asset value returns of the mutual funds
managed by the above 12 management companies from June 1985 to June 1998. Table 2 reports
summary statistics for these management companies.
We restrict the analysis to the Canadian funds investing in Canadian equity securities,11
(1)
Canadian balanced funds and Canadian equity funds investing in U.S. securities that are managed by
these twelve management companies. These three groups of funds constitute the majority of assets
in the mutual funds industry.  The characteristics of the three fund groups included in our study are
summarize in Table 3.  The average size of each comparable publicly managed and privately managed
mutual fund is approximately the same, although the management fees are uniformly higher for the
publicly managed funds. To evaluate the performance of the management companies, we use both
a single factor model and a three-factor model to measure the risk adjusted return of the mutual
funds. The methodology used to develop the mimicking portfolio returns for the factors which are
constructed from the Compustat Canadian Database and CFMRC/TSE database can be found in
Berkowitz (2000).
4.  Does Ownership Matter?
4.1 Model and Methodology
Based on the Lehmann and Modest (1987) model, we assume the data generating process for
each of the J individual security excess returns is:
where Ft is a K × 1 vector of returns on the mimicking portfolios for the common risk factors at time
t; B is the J × K matrix of factor sensitivities; and ,t is a J × 1 vector of error terms with its jth row,
,jt, representing the idiosyncratic risk of security j in period t with mean zero and finite variance.
If the mutual fund companies form a portfolio, conditioning on the data generating process







where wjt is the weight of security j in the portfolio at time t, and BjN is a 1×K vector consisting of
the jth row of B. We can rewrite (2) in matrix form as:
where
The vector $pN measures the average sensitivity of the fund to the K common risk factors and :t is
time t deviation from $pN with mean zero and finite variance. Forming the conditional expectation of
Rpt on Fkt yields:
where10 For a partial review of the papers using the multi-factor model to evaluate the mutual funds returns, see 
Elton (1993) et al and Gruber (1996)'s ''four index risk'' adjustment procedure. Blake and Timmermann (1998)






If we assume no market timing ability, then $pt will be constant (:t = 0). Superior stock
picking ability will be indicated by the regression result since equation (5) will be the same as:
where ,p will be greater than zero if the fund managers have stock selection ability, i.e. wj is positively
correlated with ,jt. Hence, if we estimate (5) using a standard regression model, the intercept, â, will
indicate the abnormal return of the mutual fund portfolio. The advantage of using the factor model
to measure performance is that it can not only indicate the stock selection ability but also the risk level
of the portfolio. The risk of the portfolio will be indicated by the regression coefficient $p which
measures the sensitivity to the risk factors.
10  
In this paper, we choose two benchmarks to estimate the abnormal performance. The first one14
(12)
(13)
is a standard single-factor, CAPM approach. The second one is based on Fama and French's (1993)
three-factor model. The three factors are: an excess market return factor (RM - R F), a size factor
(SML), and a book-to-market (HML) factor. The size and book-to-market factors are proxies for
distress since distressed firms (i.e., small size and high book-to-market) may be more sensitive to
changes in certain business cycle factors, like changes in credit conditions, than are firms that are less
financially vulnerable. Therefore, the SMB and HML factors measure the risk premium associated
with the small and value stocks. Development of the mimicking portfolio for the factors is postponed
to the next section of the paper.
The single factor (CAPM) performance evaluation model is:
and the three-factor performance evaluation model is:
where
Rpt = excess return on portfolio p in period t (net of risk free rate).
Rift = risk free rate for country i in period t.
Rimt = return on the market for country i in t.
SMBit = return on the small minus big portfolio for country i in period t.
HMLit = return on the high book-to-market less low book-to-market portfolio for country i
in t.11 Refer to Berkowitz (2000) for a complete description of the development of the Canadian factors.
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i = country index equal to 1 if Canadian equity portfolio and equal to 2 if U.S. equity
portfolio.
,pt = error term with mean zero and variance Fp
2..
4.2 Development of the Mimicking Portfolios
The proxy for the Canadian market factor is the total value weighted return of TSE stocks
less the return on the 30-day T-Bills. The other two variables used in the time-series regressions
include the returns on two mimicking portfolios for size risk (SMB) and the book-to-market (HML)
risk. The methodology used to develop the Canadian factors is based on Fama and French's (1993)
work which we briefly summarize below.
11 
A sample of firms is first created which have data available on both the CFMRC/TSE
Database and the Compustat Canadian Database over the June 1985 through June 1998 period. The
firms are then ranked by two characteristics: the size (market value) of the firm's equity and the book-
to-market ratio (BM). The median size is used to split the stocks into two size groups: small and big.
The firms are also divided into three book-to-market groups based upon the breakpoints for the
bottom 30%(Low), middle 40% (Medium), and top 30% (High) of the ranked values of BM.
The firms are then sorted into cells. The two groups for the size and three groups for the BM
give a total of six cells: small size/low BM, small size/medium BM, small size/high BM, big size/low
BM, big size/medium BM and big size/high BM. The small minus big (SMB) portfolio is meant to
mimic the return factor related to size preserving the exposure to the BM characteristic while the high
minus low (HML) portfolio is mean to mimic the return factor related to the book-to-market of equity
preserving the exposure to the size characteristic. The mimicking portfolios' returns are calculated12 Thanks are due to Eugene Fama for providing the SMB and HML factors.




SMB return = 1/3[(small size /high BM portfolio return - large
size/high BM portfolio return) + (small size/medium BM portfolio
return-large size/medium BM portfolio return) + (large size /low BM
portfolio return-large size/low BM portfolio return)] and
HML return = 1/2[(high BM/large size portfolio return - low
BM/large size portfolio return) + (high BM/small size portfolio return
- low BM/small size portfolio return)]
The proxy for the U.S market risk premium factor is the total value weighted return of the CRSP
stocks less the return on the 30-day U.S. TBill rate. For the U.S. market, SMB and HML are the
mimicking portfolio returns used in Fama and French (1993).
12   The summary statistics for the three
Canadian equity factors are provided in Table 4a while Table 4b provides the summary statistics for
the U.S. equity factors.
13 A comparison of these tables shows that the Canadian market risk premium
is about one-third of the U.S. market risk premium.  At the same time, the size and book-to-market
factors are significantly greater for the Canadian market, suggesting, on average, smaller value-
oriented firms in Canada and larger growth-oriented firms in the U.S. 
4.3 Performance Evaluation Results
To examine the differential performance of the mutual funds managed by publicly-traded and
private management companies, we construct equally weighted portfolios of the net asset value
returns for the Canadian equity funds, Canadian balance funds, and the U.S. equity funds for each14 To formally test whether the betas of Canadian equity funds are different from those of Canadian
balanced funds, we regress the difference in the return of Canadian equity funds and Canadian balanced funds on
the three factors: Req-Rbal = " + $m(Rmt-Rft) + $sSMBt + $hHMLt + ,t , where Req is the return of equity funds and
Rbal is the return of the balanced funds. Even though not reported here, the results indicate that factor loadings for
the market and size factors are positive and significantly different from zero, while the loading for the book-to-
market factor is negative and significantly different from zero.
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(14)
type of management company. For the U.S. equity funds we make a slight adjustment. Because their
return is measured in Canadian dollars and subject to exchange rate variation, we adjust the return
into U.S. dollar equivalent returns using the formula:
where Rt 
US  is the return of equity funds invested in the U.S. measured in U.S dollar in time t;
 Rt
CN
represents the returns of equity funds invested in the U.S measured in Canadian dollars in time t; and
“EXCt is the appreciation/depreciation rate of the Canadian dollar vs U.S dollar in time t.
Table 5 reports the performance evaluation results for the mutual funds managed by the
publicly-traded management companies. For the Canadian equity funds, Canadian balanced funds and
the Canadian funds invested in U.S. equities, the risk-adjusted returns appear to underperform the
benchmark whether they are evaluated using the single-factor or the three-factor model.  From the
three-factor model, we can compare the relative risk premiums associated with each of the three
factors across types of funds. First, we see that the Canadian equity funds have a higher positive
coefficient on the excess market return than do the Canadian balanced funds. Also, Canadian equity
funds have a positive coefficient on the size factor and a negative coefficient on the book-to-market
factor while the Canadian balanced funds have a negative coefficient on the size factor and a positive
coefficient on the book-to-market factor.
14 This result suggests that the Canadian equity funds hold15  The primary objective of balanced funds is to provide a mixture of safety, income and capital
appreciation, while the primary objective of the equity funds is capital gains. Because of this, equity funds usually
adopt more aggressive investment strategies than balanced funds.
16 All coefficients are significant at the 95% confidence level except for the coefficient of HML for
Canadian equity funds which is significant at the 93% confidence level,
17 We simply multiply the monthly risk adjusted return by 12 to get the annual risk adjusted return.
18  Table 7 shows that the risk-adjusted returns of the Canadian equity funds managed by publicly-traded
management companies are significantly lower than the risk-adjusted returns of the Canadian equity funds
managed by the private management companies. At the same time, the risk-adjusted returns of the Canadian
balanced funds and Canadian funds invested in U.S. equity securities do not appear to significantly differ as a
result of ownership.  
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more market sensitive, small and growth-oriented stocks than Canadian balance funds, which is
consistent with how we expect these funds to act according to the different objectives of equity funds
and balance funds.
15  Second, Canadian equity funds and Canadian funds invested in U.S. equities are
both influenced significantly by the three common equity risk factors: the market factor, the size
factor and the book-to-market factor.
16  These results suggest that the three factor model provides
a more complete measure of mutual fund performance than does the single factor model and because
of this, we focus the remaining  analysis on the results from the three-factor model. The three-factor
model suggests that the Canadian equity funds, Canadian balanced funds and U.S. equity funds
managed by the publicly-traded management companies underperform by 0.32%, 0.42% and 0.40%
per/month which is approximate 3.84%, 5.04% and 4.8% per year over the sample period.
17 
The corresponding regression results for the three types of funds managed by the six private
management companies are provided in Table 6. Focusing on the three factor model, the abnormal
returns of Canadian equity funds, Canadian balanced funds and Canadian funds invested in U.S.
equities managed by the public management companies are lower than those of the privately managed
funds by 2.04%, 0.48% and 0.12%  per year.
18  Examining the signs of the regression coefficients of19
(15)
the SMB and HML variables in Table 5 and Table 6, one can see that the publicly-traded management
companies and private management companies have similar investment styles. The Canadian equity
funds and Canadian funds invested in U.S. equities tend to hold small, growth-oriented stocks while
the Canadian balanced funds hold large, value stocks.
The results in Tables 5 and 6 also suggest that Canadian equity funds managed by publicly-
traded management companies and private management companies are both significantly influenced
by market risk and size risk. In order to see if their risk factor loadings are significantly different, we
regress the difference in the returns of the Canadian equity funds managed by the publicly-traded
management companies and the Canadian equity funds managed by the private management
companies on the three factors, i.e.,
where Rt
PUB is the return of the Canadian equity funds managed by the publicly-traded management
companies in t and Rt
PRI is the return of the Canadian equity funds managed by the private
management companies in t. The results in Table 7, panel A, show that the regression coefficient for
the size factor is positive and significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level, while other
factor loadings are not significantly different from zero. These results also indicate that the Canadian
equity funds held by the publicly-traded management companies have a significantly greater loading
on the size factor than do the Canadian equity funds managed by the private management companies.
Since equity funds primarily invest in common shares and are well diversified, we would not expect
to see their market betas to be significantly different. Hence, their risk tendency could be best
reflected in their loading for the size factors. 20
Panel B in Table 7 shows that the market factor has a significant effect in explaining the
difference in the returns of balance funds managed by the publicly-traded management companies and
private management companies. These results are also reasonable given the characteristics of balanced
funds. Since the primary goals of these funds are safety and capital gains, they typically invest a large
part of their assets in the fixed income securities and less aggressive stocks such as large cap stocks.
Hence, the market beta is the relevant risk indicator for balanced funds. The market beta will reflect
how large a portion of the assets of the balanced funds is invested in stocks and how sensitive are
those stocks to movements in the market. 
Panel C provides a similar comparison for Canadian mutual funds investing in U.S. equity
securities. The results are roughly similar to those for the Canadian equity funds in panel A and
suggest that Canadian equity funds investing in U.S. equity securities managed by publicly traded
companies have a greater loading on the size factor than do their privately managed counterparts.
In order to provide further evidence on the differences of the risk sensitivities between public-
traded management companies and private management companies, we regress the individual fund’s
return on the three factors. Table 8 summarizes the percentage of the funds with significantly positive
risk loadings on the three factors at the 95% confident level. Each of  the funds in the sample
managed by publicly-traded and private-owned managed management companies are significantly
subjected to market risk. However, 60.5%, 10.1% and 62.6% of Canadian equity funds, Canadian
balanced funds and Canadian funds investing in U.S. securities managed by the publicly-traded
management companies have significant loadings on the size factor respectively.  The percentages of
the corresponding funds managed by the private-traded management are consistently lower at 52.4%,
0% and 52.9%. In addition, 29.9%, 60%  and 23.1% of the Canadian equity funds, Canadian balanced19 Bank-run management companies can easily finance their business through their banking system. Also
they can use the existing bank branch to market their service. Therefore, they need less cash to expand their
business and have easy access to financing.
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funds and Canadian funds investing in U.S. managed by the publicly-traded management companies
have significantly positive loadings on the book-to-market factor respectively, while only 15.5%,
44.4% and 22.4% of the corresponding funds managed by the private management companies have
significantly positive loadings on the book-to-market factor, respectively.
  The above evidence presents a picture which suggests that mutual funds managed by  publicly-
traded management companies do not over-perform, and indeed under-perform the funds managed
by privately-owned management companies in the Canadian equity fund category.  Furthermore, the
funds managed by these publicly-traded management companies also tend to invest in riskier assets
than do the mutual funds managed by the privately-owned management companies.  Certainly, an
important question to ask is what are the reasons for these differences?
5.  How Does Ownership Affect Performance?
There are at least two advantages for management companies to choose to be publicly-traded.
First, listing can improve the company's access to capital. In order to benefit from the rapid expansion
within the mutual fund industry, management companies have to set up new branches, market their
products, etc. Listing is an important way of increasing their funding opportunities. In Canada, among
the top five management companies, three are publicly-traded management companies and the other
two are bank-run management companies.
19  A second reason for choosing to be publicly-traded is
that risk can be spread over a larger number of owners. In a world in which the company is owned20   Depending on the size of the transaction, ten percent of the capital raised from the listing may be used
to cover the cost for the listing. See Industry Canada: Business Turning Point: Going Public. Publication date: Oct
22 1999.
21 A number of researchers have shown this relationship, including Berkowitz and Kotowitz (1993, 2000),
Ippolito (1992) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997), among others.
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by a single manager-owner, even though there are no agency costs, the sole shareholder bears all the
investment risk and requires a higher discount rate in order to invest in a risky project. Hence risky
projects are less valuable in this situation. Public ownership reduces each shareholder’s stake within
the company and essentially diversifies the shareholder’s portfolio. Therefore, risky investments are
more valuable for the shareholders of publicly-traded management companies. This risk spreading
mechanism allows the shareholders of publicly-traded management companies to invest in riskier
assets.
On the other side of the coin, there are also some disadvantages of choosing to be publicly-
traded; otherwise, we would observe no private management companies in an ‘equilibrium’ world.
One disadvantage is that the operating costs of publicly-traded management companies may be higher
than for private companies. The costs of the IPO, reporting and public disclosure represent significant
outflows for publicly-traded companies.
20  Because of this, management companies may have an
incentive to increase their management fees in order to continue increasing their profit level, even
though they know the higher management fees will reduce the return of the mutual funds they
manage, which in turn will cause the funds to lose investment in the future.
21   Second, the agency
costs associated with publicly-traded firms are generally believed to be greater than those of
privately-owned companies. Choosing to be publicly-traded will dilute ownership and in doing so,
the owner has less control over the manager.  The manager may then increase her excess perquisite22  For example, it is much more difficult to choose the securities within a portfolio of bio-technology
stocks than in an index fund. In turn, the more easily managed  index fund charges a lower management fee than
does an actively managed fund, such as bio-technology funds.
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consumption and thus the administrative fees for the mutual fund. A higher administrative fee will in
turn reduce the performance of the mutual fund. Further, the remuneration paid to managers of
management companies is based on the performance of the mutual funds they manage, investing in
riskier assets increases the risk of the managers' portfolios.  At the same time, investing in a riskier
portfolio is more difficult and requires greater effort on the part of managers.
22  Therefore,
publicly-traded management companies must provide higher compensation for their managers. As a
result, publicly-traded management companies may charge a higher management fee than the private
management companies to compensate for their extra costs.  The manager recognizes, however, that
the higher management fee will reduce the net return of the mutual funds under management and
hence the future cash inflow to the management companies.  The manager must, therefore, trade-off
these consequences when deciding on the fee structure.
To analyze the effect of ownership on the performance of the management companies, we
concentrate on the management fee, administrative fee and the risk of the assets under management.
We have already shown in the last section that the publicly-traded management companies tend to
hold riskier assets than  privately-owned management companies, which is consistent with the risk
spreading argument. In this section, we compare the management fees and expense ratios charged
by the publicly-traded management companies and private companies to shed some light on the
agency cost issue. From Table 3, we can see that the average management fee of the funds managed
by publicly-traded management companies is much higher than the management fee of the funds
managed by private management companies. The management fees of the Canadian equity funds,23  See, for example, Baumol et al (1990) and Ferris and Chance (1987).
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(16)
Canadian balanced funds and Canadian equity funds invested in U.S. securities managed by the
publicly-traded management companies are 122%, 149% and 113%, respectively, more than those
managed by the private management companies. At the same time, the variation in management fees
for the mutual funds managed by the publicly-traded management companies is less for those funds
managed by privately managed companies. The expense ratios, which include the management fees
and administrative fees, are, like the management fees, uniformly greater for publicly-owned
management companies. However, the administrative fees of the mutual funds managed by the
publicly-traded management companies are not significantly greater than those of the mutual funds
managed by the privately-owned management companies. The average administrative fees of the
Canadian equity funds and balanced funds managed by the publicly-traded management companies
are even lower than those of the Canadian equity funds and balanced funds managed by the privately-
owned management companies. 
The traditional belief is that the level of the fee is related to the fund characteristics, such as
size of fund, number of funds within the management company complex, fund age, fund type and
service delivery.
23  To see if management company ownership affects this relationship, we run the
following regression:
where the dependent variable FEEi is the fee of mutual fund i (expense ratio, management fee or
administrative fee); SIZEi is the mutual fund i's total net asset value; MGTSIZEi is the size of mutual25
fund i's management company measured by the number of the mutual funds managed by that
management company; AGEi is the age of mutual fund i; LOADi is a dummy variable which is equal
to 1 if fund i is a load fund and is equal to 0 if the fund is a no-load fund; TYPEi is a dummy variable
which is equal to 1 if fund i is an equity fund and is equal to 0 if the fund is a balanced fund; MGTi
is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the fund i's management company is publicly-traded and
is equal to 0 if the fund's management company is private.
Table 9 reports the cross-sectional regressions used to explain the variation in management
fees, management expense ratios and administrative fees. Looking first to the determinants of the
management fees, the negative coefficients for the log(SIZEi) and log(MGTSIZEi) variables imply
that there exists economies of scale and economies of scope for the mutual fund management even
though they are not significant. The larger is the size of the mutual fund and greater are the number
of funds managed by the management company, the lower is the fee charged by the management
company. The coefficients of both AGEi and LOADi are also not significant.  The only significant
variables are the type of mutual fund and whether or not the management company is publicly-traded.
The coefficient for the dummy variable TYPEi is 0.348 and is significant at the 95% confidence level
indicating that the management fees for equity funds on average are 0.348% higher than those for
balance funds. This is not surprising since the equity funds are riskier and harder to manage and must
be compensated through higher management fees.  Particularly interesting is that the dummy variable
MGTi has a significant coefficient with a positive value 0.494. This result suggests that
publicly-traded management companies on average charge 0.494% per year more in management fees
than do the privately-owned management companies, likely as a result of some combination of higher
operating and agency costs than their privately-owned counterparts.24 See Baumol et al (1990).
25  Carhart (1997) has also shown that the high fees can explain the poor performance of certain funds.
26 From Table 3, Canadian balanced funds managed by publicly-traded management companies have an
annual MER of 1.73% while their privately managed counterparts have an annual  MER of 1.16%. The difference
is .047% per month which is approximately the difference between the " coefficient in Table 5 for Canadian
balanced funds of -.0042 and the corresponding " value of -.0038 in Table 6 for privately managed funds. 
Similarly, for Canadian equity funds invested in U.S. securities, the monthly difference in MERs is .019% while
the difference in " coefficients is approximately .01%.
26
The results for the determinants of the expense ratio are also interesting. The significant
coefficient for log(MGTSIZEi) and insignificant coefficient for log(SIZEi) indicate that the funds have
significant economies of scope but not significant economies of scale. This suggests that Canadian
mutual funds are too small compared to, for example, mutual funds in the U.S., which have been
found to have both significant economies of scale and economies of scope.
24  The administrative fee,
moreover, does not significantly depend on the ownership of the management company, suggesting
that it is not necessarily the case that the diffusion of ownership that characterizes publicly-traded
management companies increases the excess perquisite consumption of the managers.
The higher management fees shown in Table 3 for the mutual funds managed by
publicly-traded management companies could be an important factor, however, in explaining their risk
adjusted returns.
25 If we add back the difference in management fees to the difference in risk adjusted
returns of the mutual funds managed by the publicly-traded management companies and private
management companies, we find  that the risk- adjusted returns of the Canadian balanced funds and
Canadian equity funds invested in U.S. securities managed by the publicly-traded management
companies are almost the same as those for the funds managed by private management companies.
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However, even after adding back the difference in MERs, the risk-adjusted return of the Canadian
equity funds managed by publicly-managed companies are still lower than that of Canadian equity27 This question is related to another puzzle about the growth of actively managed mutual funds. In his
presidential address to American Finance Association, Gruber (1996) showed that investors can be better off by
choosing index funds rather than funds which are actively managed since the index funds have better average
performance and lower fees. However, actively managed funds have still grown substantially in the U.S. over the
past decade.  
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funds managed by private management companies by approximately 1.7% per year.
Our results also lead us to question the effectiveness of mutual fund boards of directors. The
funds' boards are expected to consider the fund performance when they negotiate with  management
companies on the fee level. They must also consider comparative fees paid by  similar funds. The
higher fees together with lower performance of the publicly-traded management companies suggests
that the mutual funds'  boards are not effective monitors. In addition, typically, each mutual fund has
one board of directors. If each board of directors is an active monitor on behalf of the unitholders,
we would expect to see some variation in the management fee among different mutual funds since
each of the funds has different characteristics. The small variation of management fees for the funds
managed by the publicly-traded management companies also suggests that mutual fund boards of
directors have not been particularly effective in negotiating fees with the management companies.
The interesting question is then: If mutual funds managed by publicly-traded management
companies have higher fees but do not have superior performance than those managed by the private
management companies, how can they attract investors within the competitive mutual fund industry?
27
One explanation is that investors lack the skill to calculate risk-adjusted returns. The mean monthly
raw returns over the entire sample period on the Canadian equity funds, Canadian balanced funds and
the U.S. equity funds managed by the publicly-traded management companies are 1.30%, 0.72% and
1.74%, respectively, while those managed by the private management companies are 1.49%, 0.74%
and 1.77%, respectively. The differences in the unadjusted returns are very small. If investors rely on28
past raw returns to select mutual funds, it would be difficult for them to differentiate between the
mutual funds managed by publicly-traded management and the mutual funds managed by the private
management companies. A second reason may be investors' ignorance of the fees they pay to the
management companies. In a survey by Capon et al. (1996), the authors showed that the majority of
investors are naive. Investors typically lack the knowledge of the investment strategies or financial
details of their investments and usually do not pay much attention to the fees charged by their mutual
funds. Therefore, even though the 0.49% per year difference in the management fee means a lot to
the management companies, it may be ignored by investors at the individual level.  Finally, it may be
due to the existence of a disadvantaged mutual fund investor clientele, which is proposed by Gruber
(1996) when he explains the puzzle for the growth of the actively managed funds. According to
Gruber, the disadvantaged clientele is made up of unsophisticated investors who make investments
based upon some factors, such as advertising, as opposed to the performance of the funds.  Also
included in this group are those investors who have pension plans and are restricted to be the part of
some funds as well as the tax disadvantaged investors who are unable to effectively move money
because of capital gains taxes. Further, not to be overlooked, is that listing could make publicly-trade
management companies in general more visible than the private management companies. Indeed,
because of the existence of the disadvantage investors, visibility may be a factor in stimulating sales
of the mutual funds managed by publicly-trade management companies .
6.   Summary and Conclusions
This paper has examined if and how ownership affects the risk and performance of mutual
funds managed by management companies. We have shown that the risk-adjusted returns of the29
mutual funds managed by the publicly-traded management companies are not higher than those of the
mutual funds managed by private management companies and in fact significantly underperform in
the Canadian equity funds category. The mutual funds managed by publicly-traded management
companies tend to invest in riskier securities and on average charge higher management fees than do
privately-owned management companies.  This phenomenon is consistent with the risk reduction
argument made by Smith and Stultz (1985).
Publicly-traded management companies also incur higher agency costs than do privately-
owned management companies,  take on more risk and in doing so, undertake greater effort to invest
in risky assets which requires greater compensation. The publicly-traded management companies will
therefore tend to charge higher management fees than the private management companies. The higher
management fees, however, lower risk-adjusted returns and are expected to have a negative impact
on future investment in these funds.
The puzzle is that if the funds managed by publicly-owned management companies do not
achieve higher performance levels but charge higher management fees, why do investors continue to
place their money in these funds?  A possible explanation for the existence of this phenomenon in the
competitive mutual fund industry is that the shareholders of the publicly-traded management
companies take advantage of the mutual fund unitholders' ignorance of management fees, their
inability to calculate risk-adjusted returns and their disadvantaged position.Given that it is still
controversial whether or not fund managers have superior stock picking ability, and the generally
accepted fact that fees are an important determinant of fund performance, our results suggest it may
be, ceteris paribus, that investors should avoid funds managed by publicly-traded management
companies when they decide in which funds to invest.30
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Canadian Mutual Funds Industry-*IFIC Members
Year Net Assets at Market Net New Sales Number of Funds Number of Unitholders
1991 49,916 12,481 505 4,533,686
1993 114,598 34,863 663 8,928,661
1995 146,228 10,272 916 15,295,121
1997 283,159 64,387 1023 32,826,069
1999 389,696 29,340 1328 45,752,433
*As of September 1991, IFIC Members represent 97% of assets under management in Canada.
Source: The Investment Funds Institute of CanadaTable 2
Management Companies Data Set Summary Statistics
The table reports the descriptive statistic for management companies’ data set and time-series averages from
June 1985 to April 1998. TNA is the total net asset value. Mgt Fee is the percentage management fee for the
management companies. Exp Ratio is the management fee plus administrative expense divided by average
NAV. Number of Fund is the number of the funds managed by the management company. Date of listing is
the date that the management company became publicly-traded. 
                                                      
Company Name
Number of
Funds     
     Avg TNA     
   ($ million) 
Avg Mgt Fee
(%/Year)
Avg Exp Ratio (%
year)
   Public /          
 Private            
  Date of
 Listing
AGF Management Ltd. 42 363.6 2.1 2.3 Public 9/1968
BPI Financial Corp. 34 149.1 1.8 2.5 Public 8/1994
CI Fund Management Inc. 58 149.7 1.8 2.4 Public 7/1994
Investors Group Corp. 50 880.7 1.7 2.5 Public 12/1986
Mackenie Financial Corp. 64 585.8 1.2 1.3 Public 10/1982
Trimark Financial Corp 30 882.3 1.6 2.2 Public 5/1992
AIC Limited 40 210.6 2.0 2.3 Private *
Royal Mutual Funds Inc. 33 731.7 1.3 1.8 Private *
Fidelity Investments Canada Limited 23 364.5 1.9 2.1 Private *
TD Asset Management 43 384.5 1.5 1.9 Private *
CIBC Securities Inc. 55 407.3 1.2 1.3 Private *
Templeton Management Limited 14 430.8 1.5 1.8 Private *Table 3
The Sample Funds 
The table reports the summary statistics for the funds included in our analysis. They are equity funds and
balanced funds invested in Canada and Equity fund invested in the U.S managed by the management companies
in Table 1. Number is the total number of the funds in each group. TNA is the average total net asset value
of the funds. Mgt Fee is the average management fee of the funds. ExpRatio is the average expense ratio of
the fund. The expense ratio is the management fee plus other administrative fee.  Age is the average age of the
funds. 















Canadian equity funds 40 10.0 757.8 1.99 0.37 2.51 0.34
Canadian balanced funds 16 14.3 849.1 1.73 0.72 2.42 0.40
Canadian funds invested 
   in U.S. equities 14 12.3 529.1 2.00 0.20 2.25 0.30















Canadian equity funds 26 6.4 754.5 1.63 0.61 2.12 0.50
Canadian balanced funds 9 11.0 1185.0 1.16 0.90 2.07 0.78
Canadian funds invested
   in U.S. equities 20 6.3 352.9 1.77 0.54 2.08 0.64Table 4a
Summary Statistics for the Canadian Risk Factors, June 1985 to June 1998
The market return (Rm) is determined using the value-weighted TSE total stock returns. The risk-free rate (RF)
is the 30-day return on Canada T-bills.  SMB and HML are calculated using the Fama and French (1993)
methodology with the CFMRC/TSE and COMPUSTAT Canadian Annual File data set. Total 157 months.
Factor Mean  Std. Dev. t-statistic Cross Correlation
Rm - RF SMB HML
Rm-RF 0.36 4.03 1.13 1.000
SMB 0.54 3.34 2.25 0.064 1.000
HML 0.46 3.95 1.44 0.097 -0.010 1.000
Table 4b
Summary Statistics for the U.S Risk Factors, June 1985 to June 1998
The market return (Rm) is determined using the value-weighted CRSP total stock returns. The risk-free rate (RF)
is the 30-day return on the U.S. T-bills. SMB and HML are the mimicking portfolio returns for the size and
book-to-market risk factors used in Fama and French (1993). Total 157 months
Factor Mean Std. Dev. t-statistic Cross Correlation
Rm - RF SMB HML
Rm-RF 0.93 4.12 2.77 1.000
SMB -0.23 2.55 -1.13 0.137 1.000
HML 0.21 2.31 1.14 -0.447 -0.271 1.000Table 5
The Performance of the Mutual Funds Managed by the Publicly-traded 
Management Companies
The table reports the performance evaluation of the mutual funds managed by the publicly-traded
management companies using the one factor CAPM approach and a three-factor model as suggested
by Fama and French (1993). For the one factor model, the abnormal return is measured by the alpha,
which is the intercept in regressions for the excess returns of the funds on the excess return of the
market return. The regression equation is:
                                                       Rt -RFt= "+ $m(Rmt –RFt) + ,t                                                     
In the three factor model, the alphas are the intercepts in the regressions of the excess returns of the
funds on the three factors, which are the market risk factor in time t (Rt-RFt), size factor in t (SMBt),
and book to market factor in t (HMLt).  The regression equation is:
                                         Rt –RFt = "+ $m (Rmt-RFt) + $sSMBt + $hHMLt + ,t                
The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  Total 157 months.
Canadian Equity Funds Canadian Balanced Funds Cdn. Eq. Funds Invested in U.S.    
 CAPM Three-Factor CAPM Three-Factor CAPM Three-Factor
Intercept -0.0028 -0.0032 -0.0044 -0.0042 -0.0049 -0.0040
(-3.40) (-4.17) (-4.89) (-4.63) (-3.56) (-2.85)
Rmt-RFt 0.8094 0.8067 0.4642 0.4653 0.9204 0.8774
(39.84) (42.68) (20.81) (20.99) (28.42) (24.58)
   SMBt      0.1120 -0.0592 0.1156
(4.99) (-2.25) (2.17)
HMLt -0.0349 0.0216 -0.1379
        (-1.82) (0.96) (-2.11)
  Adj-R
2 0.91 0.93 0.74 0.75 0.84 0.85Table 6
The Performance of the Mutual Funds Managed by the Private Management Companies
The table reports the performance evaluation of the mutual funds managed by the publicly-traded
management companies using the one factor CAPM approach and a three-factor model as suggested
by Fama and French (1993). For the one factor model, the abnormal return is measured by the alpha,
which is the intercept in regressions for the excess returns of the funds on the excess return of the
market return. The regression equation is:
                                                       Rt -RFt= "+ $m(Rmt –RFt) + ,t                                                     
In the three factor model, the alphas are the intercepts in the regressions of the excess returns of the
funds on the three factors, which are the market risk factor in time t (Rt-RFt), size factor in t (SMBt),
and book to market factor in t (HMLt).  The regression equation is:
                                            Rt –RFt = "+ $m (Rmt-RFt) + $sSMBt + $hHMLt + ,t                
The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  Total 157 months.
Canadian Equity Funds Canadian Balanced Funds Cdn Eq. Funds Invested in U.S.
CAPM Three-Factor CAPM Three-Factor CAPM Three-Factor
Intercept -0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0040 -0.0038 -0.0046 -0.0039
(-1.19) (-2.02) (-4.74) (-4.48) (-2.73) (-2.16)
Rmt-RFt 0.7761 0.8221 0.4026 0.4038 0.9203 0.8921
(39.26) (44.59) (19.08) (19.41) (22.84) (19.38)
   SMBt     0.0671 -0.0667 0.0368
(3.06) (-2.70) (0.53)
HMLt -0.0050 0.0254 -0.1066
(-0.26) (1.21) (-1.27)
  Adj-R
2 0.89 0.93 0.70 0.72 0.71 0.77Table 7
The Difference In the Risk Loadings Between the Mutual Funds Managed by the 
Publicly-traded Management Companies and Private Management Companies
This table compares the risk loadings of Canadian equity funds, Canadian balanced funds, and
Canadian equity funds investing in U.S. securities managed by publicly-traded management companies
with the risk loadings of their  privately managed counterparts. The regression equation is:
Rjt
PUB –  Rjt
PRI =  "j + $mj (Rmt-RFt) + $sjSMBt + $hjHMLt + ,jt
where Rjt
PUB is the equally-weighted return of the type j mutual funds managed by the publicly-traded
management companies in t and  Rjt
PRI  is the equally-weighted return of the type j mutual funds
managed by the private management companies in t. 
A. Dependent variable: The difference in the return of the Canadian equity funds managed by the publicly-
traded management companies and private management companies.





B. Dependent variable: The difference in the return of the Canadian balanced funds managed by the publicly-
traded management companies and private management companies.





C. Dependent variable: The difference in the return of the Canadian equity funds invested in U.S. securities
managed by the publicly-traded management companies and private management companies.




HMLt -0.0155 -0.21Table 8
Percentage of  Funds with Significant Risk Loadings on Three Factors
This table compares the percentages the funds having significantly positive risk loading at 95% confident







Invested in U.S. (%)
Market Risk 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Size Risk 60.5 52.4 10.1 0.0 62.6 52.9
Book to
Market Risk
29.9 15.5 60.0 44.4 23.1 22.4Table 9
Cross-Sectional Regression for the Determinants for the Management Fee, 
Administrative Fee and Expense Ratio 
The table reports the cross-sectional regressions for determinants of the management fees,
expense ratio and administrative fees of the funds managed by the publicly-traded management
companies and private management companies. The expense ratio includes the management fee
and administrative fee. The dependent variables, FEEi, is management fee, administrative fee or
expense ratio for fund i. The independent variables are log(SIZEi), log(MGTSIZEi), AGEi,
LOADi, TYPEi, MGTi. SIZEi is mutual fund i's total net asset value. MGTSIZE is the size of 
mutual fund i's management company measured by the number of the mutual funds that the
management company manages. AGEi is the age of mutual fund i. LOADi is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the fund i is a load fund and equal to 0 if the fund is a no-load fund. TYPEi is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if fund i is an equity fund and equal to 0 if the fund is a balanced fund.
MGTi is a dummy variable and equal to 1 if the fund i's management company is publicly-traded
and equal to 0 if the fund's management company is private. The regression equation is:
           FEEi  =  a + b1Log(SIZEi) + b2Log(MGTSIZEi) + b3AGEi + b4LOADi + b5TYPEi + b6MGTi
A. Dependent variable: Management Fees







B. Dependent variable: Expense Fees







C. Dependent Variable: Administrative Fees
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Figure 1a
Mutual Fund Complex
Figure 1b
Corporation